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Abstract
The authors examine the investment behaviour of a sample of small, credit-constrained ﬁrms in
Sri Lanka. Using a unique panel-data set, they analyze and compare the activities of two groups of
small ﬁrms distinguished by their different access to ﬁnancing; one group consists of ﬁrms with
heavily subsidized loans from the World Bank, and the other consists of ﬁrms without such
subsidies. The use of program-evaluation techniques reveals that the relaxation of ﬁnancing
constraints did not affect economic efﬁciency for the group of ﬁrms that received subsidized
capital.
JEL classiﬁcation: G00, O16
Bank classiﬁcation: Development economics
Résumé
Les auteurs examinent le comportement de l’investissement d’un échantillon de petites
entreprises sri lankaises ayant un accès limité au crédit. À partir d’un ensemble unique de
données longitudinales, ils analysent et comparent les activités de deux groupes de petites
entreprises qui se distinguent par leur capacité d’accès au crédit. Le premier groupe se compose
d’entreprises disposant de prêts subventionnés largement par la Banque mondiale, tandis que le
second réunit des entreprises qui ne bénéﬁcient pas de cette forme de subvention. Les méthodes
employées pour évaluer le programme de prêt montrent que le relâchement des contraintes
ﬁnancières n’a pas eu d’incidence sur l’efﬁcience économique du groupe d’entreprises
bénéﬁciaires d’un ﬁnancement subventionné.
Classiﬁcation JEL : G00, O16
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Économie du développement1
1. Introduction
Considerable research, both theoretical and empirical, explores the consequences of market
imperfections in credit markets on ﬁrm-level performance.1 In particular, small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) are believed to suffer disproportionately in their ability to access credit when
ﬁnancial markets are undeveloped, segmented, or subject to arbitrary credit-allocation
mechanisms. In these environments, asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers
affects the ability of ﬁrms to access credit and therefore hinders investment, ultimately affecting
aggregate economic activity. Consequently, there is keen interest on the part of policy-makers to
ensure that SMEs are able to access ﬁnancing when faced with credit market imperfections.
Widespread acknowledgement of the impact of credit market imperfections on economic
behaviour has led to signiﬁcant efforts to correct cases of market failure. While broader ﬁnancial
market reforms have been implemented in many developing countries, these interventions tend to
favour larger, publicly traded ﬁrms over the ﬁnancing needs of SMEs. In light of this fact, the
World Bank initiated Small and Medium Industries (SMI) loan programs designed speciﬁcally to
address the ﬁnancing needs of SMEs in a number of developing countries.2 Despite the
considerable resources devoted to these programs, there is little evidence of their effectiveness.
We assess the impact of a World Bank SMI loan program on the behaviour of a sample of SMEs
in Sri Lanka. Using a unique panel-data set, we analyze and compare the activities of two groups
of SMEs distinguished by their different access to ﬁnancing; one group consists of ﬁrms with
subsidized loans from the World Bank, and the other group consists of ﬁrms without such
subsidies. Particular attention is paid to addressing the potential biases that stem from self-
selection in the loan program. We ﬁnd that the World Bank SMI loan program led to a relaxation
of credit constraints and higher levels of investment for ﬁrms that received the subsidies. There is
little evidence, however, to suggest that the loan program had a positive impact on economic
efﬁciency; it did not resolve the problem of capital market imperfections. Simple empirical tests
of reduced-form proﬁt and input demand functions derived from proﬁt maximization show that
the relaxation of ﬁnancing constraints did not affect the absolute or relative economic efﬁciency
of the group of ﬁrms that received loans from the SMI program. That is, SMI recipients did not
have higher proﬁts nor were they more allocatively efﬁcient than non-recipient ﬁrms. The use of
program-evaluation techniques to correct for self-selection and sample bias conﬁrms these results.
1. The seminal theoretical work is Stiglitz and Weiss (1981); Povel and Raith (2001) offer recent
insights. Empirical work is also very extensive. See Allayannis and Mozumdar (2001), Gallego and
Loayza (2000), Bigsten et al. (1999), Mairesse et al. (1999), Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Bond et al.
(1997), Bondand Meghir (1994), and Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) for examples. Hubbard
(1998) provides a ﬁne surveyof the major issues.
2. For instance, it isestimated that over$3.7 billion was lent to SMEs by national governments and
international lending institutions between 1973 and 1989 (Webster 1989). Interestingly, there is little
evidence of the effectiveness of these programs, and, inparticular, of the SMI program.2
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy describes the SMI loan program and the
survey data. Section 3 describes key regressions used in assessing the impact of the loan program.
Section 4 addresses the econometric issues of program evaluation and describes solutions. Section
5 provides descriptive statistics from the survey data, and section 6 presents results. Section 7
offers some conclusions.
2. SMI Loan Program and Survey
2.1 SMI loan program
The SMI loan program for Sri Lanka was developed to assist with the reform of its economic
system, initiated after 1977. The program’s success clearly depended on the success of more
fundamental reforms in the economy, but it was felt that the program could help develop the
institutions and mechanisms that would be required by a more autonomous, market-oriented
economy. Manufacturing industry in the late 1970s contributed about 17 per cent of GDP in Sri
Lanka; private ﬁrms contributed about half of manufacturing value added, two-thirds of which
came from unregistered small ﬁrms. Private sector ﬁrms were a fraction of the size of public
sector companies. The average number of employees of the 1400 largest private companies was
small, 42,3 while the typical unregistered ﬁrm employed family labour supplemented by at most
two or three hired workers. It was expected that the SMI loan program would help the growth of
entrepreneurship in a sector that also supported more labour-intensive growth, through the
provision of credit for capital expenditures. At the same time, it was designed to direct credit
away from a banking sector that largely carried out government directives, and to encourage the
development of lending institutions that could provide project-based, rather than strictly
collateral-based, funding to private sector businesses that were largely ignored by the banking
sector. In this respect, the program aimed to increase economic efﬁciency through project-based
lending.
At ﬁrst impression, the program might seem contradictory to the broader aim of promoting
decision-making by private sector institutions. A targeted loan program could be accused of
carrying on the dirigiste tradition. But the justiﬁcation of the program was that it sought to
mitigate the consequences of the old system, under which the large state-owned enterprises had
set up vertically integrated operating modes that discriminated against the development of SMEs.
Furthermore, the state-controlled banking system, lending at negative interest rates to loss-making
public enterprises and their subsidiaries, had few funds left for the development of private ﬁrms.
3. Sri Lanka: 1980 Annual Survey of Establishments.3
While targeting assistance based on the size of ﬁrms, albeit with a size limitation that increased by
more than 50 per cent in real terms over the period of the four credits, the program was designed
to help in the ultimate elimination of the need for such lines of credit.
Between 1979 and 1991, the World Bank provided Sri Lanka with $110 million in ﬁnancing for
SMIs through a series of four credit programs: SMI I, SMI II, SMI III, and SMI IV.4 The World
Bank did not lend the funds directly; rather, the program operated through an autonomous body
known as the National Development Board (NDB). The NDB provided capital to participating
ﬁnancial institutions (PFIs), which then retailed the loanable funds to ﬁrms.5 Under the SMI
program, ﬁrms would approach the participating credit institutions and apply for a loan.6 Upon
approval, the ﬁrm’s application would be forwarded to the NDB, which in turn would approve the
loan and consequently reﬁnance the PFI. Initially, 80 per cent of the loans were reﬁnanced—but
this ﬁgure fell to 75 per cent and 70 per cent, respectively—by SMI III and IV. The eligibility
requirements for the SMI program restricted access to those ﬁrms from the following sectors:
manufacturing, mining, construction, agriculture industries, ﬁsh processing, industrial services,
horticulture, commercial transport, and animal husbandry. With respect to ﬁrm size, there was no
minimum scale, but ﬁrms could not have more than a set level of ﬁxed assets, and loan size was
limited accordingly. The allowed debt-to-equity ratio was 75:25 and ﬁrms had to be prepared to
contribute 25 per cent of the cost of the project themselves. There were collateral requirements
and interest rates were initially ﬁxed, but they later moved to adjustable nominal rates to ensure
positive real interest rates.
The lending mechanism of the SME program was designed to ensure that market forces
determined how the PFIs distributed loans. On the lending side, the NDB was wholesaling funds
(not providing grants), and only for a portion of the loan; retail lenders had to provide between 20
and 25 per cent of the funds themselves, thus ensuring that loan losses were borne by the retail
lender directly. This meant that retailing banks would engage in the necessary screening and
monitoring activity so that only ﬁrms with good projects and strong balance sheets would receive
funding. On the borrowing side, ﬁrms were required to provide 25 per cent of the project’s cost
from their own equity, and collateral was necessary. Thus, ﬁrms could not view the program as a
cheap source of capital with no expected repayment—rather, the program was like any other
4. While the programdid not directly subsidize ﬁrms, in that the interest ratesof SMIloans were below
market rates,there was an implicit subsidy. The funds from the World Bank wouldnot have been
available to Sri Lanka, and thus represent a subsidy.
5. The PFIs could be existing state-owned banks, but new or developing commercial banks were
encouraged to be PFIs.
6. The majority of loans were granted by the Bank of Ceylon, the People’s Bank, and the DFCC.
However, by SMI III, more than 10 banks were participating in the scheme.4
formal ﬁnancial-sector lending arrangement. Although it would appear that subsidies were not
provided, an implicit subsidy did exist, since the program sought to mimic market outcomes.
Given the extent of credit market failure (and credit rationing) in Sri Lanka, if funding from the
SME program was not available, ﬁrms would have had to seek credit from more expensive
alternative sources.
2.2 Survey data
The data used in this paper were generated by a World Bank “Small and Medium Industry Impact
Evaluation (SMIIE)” survey conducted in 1996. The survey covered 300 ﬁrms ranging in size
from one to over 600 employees. The sample was split evenly between those ﬁrms that received
an SMI loan (treatment group) and those that did not (control group). The treatment group
received their loans from SMI II and III.7 The treatment group was chosen to reﬂect the
proportion of ﬁrms by the value of total loans by location, sector, and ﬁrm size. The control group
was chosen on the basis of similarity to the treatment group in terms of observable characteristics:
size, location, and industry type. The survey data include a wide range of ﬁrm level
characteristics: sales, ﬁxed assets, employment, ﬁnances, and technology. There is also
considerable information on owner characteristics and legal organization. In each case, ﬁrms
provided detailed statistics for the year 1995 and recall data from 1992 and 1985.8
3. SMI Program Assessment
To assess the impact of the SMI program, an evaluation must be made of how ﬁrms in the
treatment group changed their behaviour relative to the control group. Speciﬁcally, three research
questions are of interest: (i) did the SMI loan program relax the credit constraints of ﬁnancially
constrained ﬁrms, (ii) did the mix of inputs change, and (iii) what was the impact of changes in
input use on economic efﬁciency as measured by proﬁtability? Each question will be addressed in
turn.
3.1 Financing constraints and investment
Empirical modelling of ﬁrms’ investment behaviour in the presence of ﬁnancing constraints has
followed three alternatives in the literature: a standard accelerator approach, Tobin’s q method,
and a Euler equation approach (Hubbard 1998). Despite the apparent heterogeneity of
7. SMI I and IV ﬁrms are excluded from the sample.
8. The survey initially sought to collect data for each year between 1985 and 1995, but many ﬁrms were
unable toprovide such detailed information.5
econometric investment models, there is considerable similarity among them, considering their
actual implementation in functional form. We follow a standard accelerator approach to assess the
impact of the SMI program on investment behaviour. Bigsten et al. (1999) suggest the following
functional form of the accelerator model:
, (1)
where I is investment, K is capital, V is change in value added, is proﬁts, and the Xs are ﬁrm
level characteristics (see Appendix A for the model).9 Before we describe the testable
implications of (1), a brief discussion of the difﬁculties in estimating investment equations is
warranted.
In economies characterized by signiﬁcant transaction and information costs (such as Sri Lanka), it
becomes difﬁcult to distinguish empirically between investments caused by changes in capital
market constraints and investments caused by changes in future growth opportunities. Thus, an
increase in a ﬁrm’s current cash ﬂow or internal net worth may reduce moral hazard and adverse-
selection problems in the capital market, increasing the supply of ﬁnancing to the ﬁrm and, as a
result, investment. Alternatively, the increase in net worth may just be due to improvements in
investment opportunities. In fact, empirical observations of a positive association between net
worth (cash ﬂow) and investment may simply reﬂect the positive relationship between investment
and expected future proﬁtability, and are fully consistent with the neoclassical investment model
(and the model developed by Modigliani and Miller 1958) with perfect capital markets.
Improvements in growth opportunities shift to the right the marginal efﬁciency of investment
schedule, thereby increasing investment, but the attendant increase in proﬁtability (or internal net
worth) serves to reduce transaction and information costs, which increases the supply of ﬁnancing
to the ﬁrm, again increasing investment. Thus, it becomes difﬁcult to decompose investment into
demand-induced and supply-induced components when there are capital market imperfections.
In a cross-section of ﬁrms, the impact of proﬁtability or net worth on the supply of credit should
be more pronounced for ﬁrms that face higher transaction and information costs in ﬁnancial
markets; we can call such ﬁrms ﬁnancially “constrained,” while those facing low information
costs can be called ﬁnancially “unconstrained.” Ideally, empirical research should identify ﬁrm
characteristics that affect the transaction and information costs that face a ﬁrm in ﬁnancial
markets that are at the same time independent of demand (or marginal efﬁciency of investment)
parameters. Cash ﬂow (or net worth) does not satisfy this criterion. We must therefore ﬁnd
9. To account fully for ﬁrmlevel heterogeneity,(1) is also estimated using ﬁrst differences.
IK t 1 – ¤a 0 a1DVK ¤ t 1 – a2 P K ¤ () t 1 – a3Xt et ++ + + =
DP6
additional ﬁrm attributes in order to distinguish, in a cross-sectional study, between ﬁrms facing
signiﬁcant transaction and information costs in capital markets (constrained ﬁrms) and those for
whom the disparity between the costs of internal and external funds is not signiﬁcant
(unconstrained ﬁrms). If this can be done, it may help to distinguish empirically between
investment caused by changes in ﬁnancial market constraints and that caused by changes in future
growth opportunities. Possible ﬁrm attributes relating to information costs in capital markets
include the ﬁrm’s age, industry type, size, and past ﬁnancing record. Using such attributes in
conjunction with cash ﬂow (or net worth) may distinguish investment expenditures caused by
changes in expected growth opportunities from investment induced by changes in transaction and
information costs facing the ﬁrm in the capital market.
As discussed above, in a world with asymmetric information in credit markets, the testable
implications of (1) are that the coefﬁcients for changes in value added and past proﬁts should be
positive, since they can proxy for future investment opportunities. In a world characterized by
perfect capital markets, perfect information, and no uncertainty, the demand for funds would
depend entirely upon the perfect forecasts of future investment opportunities, and therefore
estimating (1) should produce only signiﬁcant relationships with respect to the adjustment cost of
capital. That is, the demand for credit would not depend upon current or past measures of
proﬁtability, cash ﬂow, or net worth, nor would other ﬁrm characteristics that signal ﬁrm quality
or creditworthiness matter. Under imperfect but symmetric information, value added and
proﬁtability may be important, since they could signal the quality of future investment
opportunities. If information is asymmetric, then these variables could also signal a ﬁrm’s
creditworthiness. That is, value added, proﬁts, and the Xs could capture the ﬁrm’s ability to access
credit, which directly affects the investment process.10 Lagged proﬁts could be positively related
to future investment if ﬁrms rely on internal funds and the investment process is “lumpy.”
Likewise, the coefﬁcient for current and past proﬁtability should signal to the market the ﬁrm’s
creditworthiness. Lastly, if ﬁrm characteristics such as age, location, industry type, or owner
ability are seen as potential sources of information to the lender, then these variables should also
matter. That is, if some ﬁrm characteristics can mitigate information asymmetries, then ﬁrms that
possess those characteristics should have easier access to credit and therefore higher levels of
investment.
We can use the accelerator framework to assess whether ﬁrms in the treatment group behaved
differently given that each was able to access credit. Estimating (1) separately for each group of
10. Foragooddiscussionoftheempiricalproblemsencounteredinestimatingdeterminantsofinvestment
when thereare capital market imperfections, see Hubbard(1998).7
ﬁrms, respectively, can provide evidence of whether the SMI program was successful in relaxing
the ﬁnancial constraints of the ﬁrms that did receive loans. Speciﬁcally, the estimation of (1)
should provide different estimates of the coefﬁcients for change in value added and lagged cash
ﬂow for the two groups of ﬁrms.11 Firms that received loans from the SMI program should exhibit
lower coefﬁcient values for changes in value added and lagged proﬁts, relative to the control
group.12 This conjecture is based upon the notion that those ﬁrms that were able to access the
program were less ﬁnancially “constrained” than those that did not.
3.2 Input use and proﬁtability
Most empirical studies of ﬁnancial constraints and ﬁrm level behaviour focus on the ﬁrst criterion
of the program evaluation: the effect of ﬁnancial constraints on investment. The inability of the
accelerator framework to address the more fundamental question of efﬁciency, however, is a
shortcoming of much of the current literature.13 There are numerous ways in which to measure
economic efﬁciency. Most studies assess improvements in efﬁciency by measuring changes in
total factor productivity (TFP), which requires estimation of a stochastic production function
frontier model. Estimation of TFP by these methods, however, relies heavily on functional form
and on strong assumptions about the nature of the production function.14 An alternative to
measuring the impact of the SMI program is the dual approach of proﬁt maximization and/or cost
minimization. Speciﬁcally, the effect of the SMI program on input use can be viewed through its
inﬂuence on the shadow cost of capital for recipient ﬁrms. That is, under proﬁt maximization,
ﬁrms set the level of capital such that the marginal product of capital equals its marginal shadow
price:
11. There may be differences between those ﬁrms that access the SMI program and those that do not, and
these sources of self-selection would necessarily bias the results of estimating (1). That is, we would
expect that ﬁrmlevel characteristics that are correlated with access toSMI credit would also be
correlatedtoinvestmentbehaviour,therebyproducingbiasedresults(Hubbard1998).However,these
sources of self-selection, at least in terms of observables, canbe accommodated within a standard
switching regression framework (Maddala 1988).
12. Fazzari, Hubbard, and Peterson (1988) argue that ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms should have higher
sensitivity tocash ﬂow than ﬁnancially unconstrained ﬁrms. However, their results have been
challenged by Kaplan and Zingales (1997). Replies and comments from both sets of authors (Fazzari,
Hubbard, and Peterson 2000;Kaplan and Zingales 2000) offer further explanations regarding the use
of the accelerator model to assess the sensitivity of investment to cashﬂow. Their discussion centres
on the question of how to distinguish the difference between ﬁnancially “constrained” and
“unconstrained” ﬁrms. Often, the distinction isarbitrary and leads to spurious results.
13. For instance, Gallego and Loayaza (2000) use the accelerator framework to explore the impact of
ﬁnancial liberalization and macroeconomic policy on ﬁrmlevel behaviour inChile. They ﬁnd strong
evidence that ﬁnancial market liberalization leads to a reduction of a ﬁrm’s reliance on internal funds
for investment and higher rates of investment growth.
14. See Greene (2002) for an extensive discussion of the issues in estimating TFP usingfrontier methods.8
(2)
where V is output, X is a vector of inputs,  indexes the decision rule, is the price of the jth
input, and is the price of output (Yotopoulos and Lau 1971). In a world of imperfect markets,
ﬁrms will face differential shadow input prices, depending on the value of k. Access to the SMI
program implies that the treatment group should face a lower shadow price of capital than the
control group ( ). If capital markets are characterized by asymmetric information,
then the shadow cost of capital would be greater than its market price, which implies that, for all
ﬁrms, . If ﬁrms are able to access the program (and its subsidized capital), then this
treatment group should experience a higher rate of ﬁxed-asset growth than the control group,
given the lower shadow cost of capital for these ﬁrms. Likewise, if ﬁnancial capital is fungible
within the ﬁrm, it could also be the case that ﬁrms in the treatment group adjust the use of other
inputs in the production process. That is, treatment ﬁrms will follow a different behavioural rule
than the control group with respect to the use of variable inputs. Speciﬁcally, how ﬁrms adjust the
quantity of labour will also be explored.
If ﬁrms are able to adjust their input use given the relaxation of credit constraints, then this should
translate directly into higher levels of proﬁtability. Yotopoulos and Lau (1971) describe a simple
test of this proposition. Under Cobb-Douglas15 assumptions, two simple reduced-form equations
for ﬁrm proﬁts and variable input (labour) demand can be derived:
, (3)
, (4)
where is actual proﬁts, SMI/NSMI indicates that the ﬁrm received/did not receive an SMI loan,
W is the average wage rate, R is the rental rate of capital, K is the capital stock, ISIC is industry,
LOC is the ﬁrm’s location, and L is the quantity of labour used by the ﬁrm (see Appendix B for
the derivation). The expected signs for the inputs are straightforward: higher wages and rental
rates for capital should lead to lower proﬁts. The estimation of (3) and (4) can be used to test three
hypotheses. The ﬁrst is the equal relative economic efﬁciency of SMI and non-SMI ﬁrms:
. Rejection of implies that SMI ﬁrms differ in economic efﬁciency from non-SMI
ﬁrms. If , then the SMI program resulted in higher levels of proﬁtability for the ﬁrms that
received the treatment. The second hypothesis is the equal relative price efﬁciency of SMI and
non-SMI ﬁrms: . If one rejects , then ﬁrms differ in terms of price efﬁciency
15. Interestingly, one cannot reject constant returns to scale (CRS) when one estimates a production
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(that is, differs). The third hypothesis is absolute price efﬁciency: and
. Rejection of or implies that the ﬁrms are not absolutely price-efﬁcient.16
4. Econometric Issues
The means by which ﬁrms accessed the SMI program naturally raises questions regarding the
potential biases that stem from endogeneity. That is, how does placement into the treatment group
bias the estimates from the models described above? Selection can originate from two features of
the SMI program: who applies and who is accepted. In terms of the application process, the self-
selection problem can be two-sided. If ﬁrms that want to access the program do so because they
have favourable investment opportunities that require access to external funds, then the selection
bias will be positive. However, if ﬁrms apply to the program because they are unable to access
credit from the formal ﬁnancial sector, since they have unfavourable projects, then the selection
bias could be negative. In either case, conditional on application, the screening process would
imply that accepted ﬁrms are positively selected, because banks would choose only the best credit
risks from the pool of applicant ﬁrms. For both the estimation of the proﬁt function and the
accelerator model, the direction of the expected bias will be discussed below and, more
importantly, solutions proposed to account for these potential biases.
4.1 Evaluating program effects
The problem of endogeneity described above makes it difﬁcult to evaluate the impact of program
participation for the accelerator and proﬁt function equations. In both cases, estimation by
ordinary least squares (OLS) will produce only unbiased estimates of program effects if program
participation is exogenous. That is, ﬁrms that access the program would have to be identical to
ﬁrms that did not, other than the fact that the program is exogenously available to the recipients. It
is evident that participation is not exogenous in the case of the SMI program, because only those
ﬁrms that have good projects and sufﬁcient collateral would be able to access the program.
Nevertheless, OLS can still produce unbiased estimates of program effects if the characteristics
that determine participation are observable.17 It is most likely, however, that program
participation is a function of ﬁrm characteristics that are typically unobservable. Firm
16. An empirical stochastic production frontiermodel could also be estimated to determine whether the
treatment group had higher levels of efﬁciency. Preliminary estimates were consistent with the proﬁt
functionestimationresults—thetreatmentgroupdidnotbecomemoreefﬁcient(infact,theywereless
so).
17. This depends onwhether one has enough “controls” toaccount for the determinants of program
participation.
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characteristics such as managerial competence, social ties, and/or the availability of good projects
may determine which ﬁrms gain access to the program. Consequently, it is necessary to determine
how endogenous program participation will bias the results, and how this bias can be accounted
for in the estimation procedure.
The effects of endogenous program participation with respect to the estimation of the accelerator
model are clear: ﬁrm characteristics that are correlated with access to the SMI program will also
be correlated with investment behaviour (Hubbard 1998). Given that selection is positive, the
coefﬁcients of value added and proﬁtability will be biased upwards for the treatment group when
estimating (1) by OLS. In order to account for self-selection, switching regression techniques can
be used to account for the potential endogeneity of SMI program participation (Appendix C).
Similarly, self-selection affects the assessment of program effects on proﬁtability. From (3), the
Yotopoulos and Lau (1973) framework estimates the average impact of program participation as:
, (5)
where are the proﬁts of the ﬁrms in the state when they receive the program and when they
do not; SMI = 1 indicates program eligibility, 0 otherwise; and the “return” from accessing credit
is equivalent to . If only the best ﬁrms access the program, the estimate of the “return” to an
SMI loan will be biased upwards. That is, the positive effect on proﬁts by unobservable attributes,
such as better project quality and managerial competence, will be captured by the coefﬁcient for
program participation, leading to an incorrect assessment of program impacts. Following Greene
(2000), one can estimate a “treatment-effects” model to account for endogeneous program
participation (see Appendix D for the full model).
4.2 Matching methods
The non-experimental techniques described above rely on the fact that the treatment and control
groups share common supports for the distribution of ﬁrm characteristics. That is, ﬁrms in the
treatment and control groups are comparable across a range of characteristics, such as ﬁrm size,
age, and proﬁtability. Heckman et al. (1996), however, show that if the supports of the distribution
are not similar, then implementation of standard non-experimental techniques may produce biased
estimates of program impacts, because OLS estimates of program effects assume that the impact
of the program can be captured entirely by the single index X’ß, which may not be related to the
ﬁrm’s propensity to participate in the program. Furthermore, OLS implies a common program
effect across all ﬁrms. If there were substantial differences between the control and treatment
groups, then the estimates of the program would be biased, because the treatment group could
respond differently to the treatment. For example, the treatment group may consist of young,
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growth-oriented ﬁrms located in urban areas, and the control group may consist of older,
established ﬁrms that operate in rural areas; the effect of access to subsidized credit may therefore
differ substantially between ﬁrms, and these differences are not resolved by the standard
treatment-effects models and switching regression techniques described above. For example, the
treatment-effects model estimates the difference between participants and non-participants as:
. (6)
To accurately assess the impact of the program, it is necessary to calculate the effect of the
treatment (the SMI program) on the treated (those who accessed the program):
. (7)
That is, it is necessary to observe the outcomes of the ﬁrms that received the treatment and
compare them with a control group of ﬁrms that are otherwise identical, except for the fact that
they did not have access to the program (but are eligible to take up the treatment and would do so,
given its availability). Unfortunately, the second term of the right-hand side of (7) does not exist in
the data, since it is not observed. A solution is to create through the
implementation of a randomized experiment: ﬁrms would apply to the SMI program and a
proportion of the accepted ﬁrms would be randomly denied access. This would create a true-
control group sample analogue that could be used to determine the difference between the
outcomes of those ﬁrms that accessed the program and the outcomes if the program had not
existed. While randomized experiments have been successfully implemented in certain settings,
techniques of this sort are not readily accepted by development practitioners for evaluating the
impact of credit programs.18
A solution to this evaluation problem is to create the counterfactual by
matching treatment and control ﬁrms along observable characteristics. For every ﬁrm in the
treatment group, a ﬁrm in the control group can be found that is identical in every respect except
for the availability of an SMI loan. For instance, if the treatment group consisted of young, urban-
based, and highly proﬁtable ﬁrms in the machinery business, one would like to ﬁnd similarly
proﬁtable ﬁrms, from the same industrial type and location, in the control group. Typically, there
are many dimensions along which to match ﬁrms, and if the dimensionality of the match becomes
very large, it becomes difﬁcult if not impossible to ﬁnd matches. Fortunately, there is a solution to
this problem, known as “matching methods.” Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that, instead of
matching along X, one can match along P(X), the probability that the ﬁrm participated in the
18. A large literature has evolved around the use of randomized experiments to evaluate job training
programs. See Heckman, Lalonde, and Smith (1999) for a complete survey.
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treatment group, and still estimate consistent and unbiased estimates of the effect of program
participation on the treated.
Several methods of matching can be considered: “without replacement,” “with replacement,” and
nearest-neighbour techniques (Dehejia and Wahba 1998). The standard technique, matching
without replacement, is conducted as follows. First, a logit and/or probit regression is run to
generate a scalar measure of the probability of loan-program participation, P(X). Then, the data
are sorted according to the estimate of P(X), from highest to lowest. Each ﬁrm in the treatment
group is matched to a control ﬁrm, in descending order, and this technique is repeated until each
treatment ﬁrm is matched with a ﬁrm from the control group. This technique can also be done
“with replacement,” in which case P(X) is estimated and the data randomly ordered. Then each
ﬁrm in the treatment group is matched with the ﬁrm from the control group that is its nearest
neighbour. In this way, different treatment ﬁrms may have the same control-group analogue.
Lastly, each treatment ﬁrm is matched with those control ﬁrms within some radius of P(X) and
the weighted average is taken of the characteristics of those ﬁrms in the radius.19
The ability of matching-method techniques to construct a suitable control-group sample analogue
depends on the following crucial assumption:
. (8)
Conditional on the propensity score, the outcome in the non-participation state is independent of
participation. That is, if the Xs capture the participation decision, then the control group will have
the same characteristics as the treatment group, and thus the outcome in the non-participation
state will be the same in the two groups, conditional on the propensity score. For this result to
hold, Smith and Todd (2001) suggest that the data must possess three criteria: (i) the data for the
control and treatment group must come from the same source; (ii) the outcomes must occur in the
same geographic region; and (iii) the data must be “sufﬁciently rich” that (8) holds. The
limitations of matching methods are a function of these conditions. In particular, the matching
technique relies heavily on the third criterion, the availability of a rich set of conditioning
variables. The ability to create suitable counterfactuals to the treatment group depends on the
ability to match along observable characteristics. If the process of selection into the participation
and non-participation states is a function of unobservables that are not captured by the observable
data, then the control group may not be properly speciﬁed. In this sense, the limitation of using
the propensity score as a measure of “comparability” is determined by the availability of sufﬁcient
19. The size of is determined by the researcher. Likewise, one canuse local linear regression or kernel
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conditioning variables. If the decision to participate in the program is poorly measured, the
treatment and control groups will be poorly matched, and any inferences on the effect of the
“treatment on the treated” will be biased in an undetermined manner. In this way, matching may
actually accentuate the biases caused by selection on unobservables (Smith and Todd 2001).
Conversely, if the observable data sufﬁciently determine participation, then the beneﬁts of
matching are large. By reducing the dimensionality of the match to a univariate measure, it is
possible to generate for each ﬁrm in the treatment group its sample analogue in the control group.
Matching methods allow for a straightforward assessment (along P(X)) to determine whether the
supports of the distribution of the control-group characteristics differ from those of the treatment
group. Firms in the control group that fall outside the support of the treatment group are discarded
from the sample. Likewise, treatment-group ﬁrms that have no comparable control-group
analogues are removed from the assessment procedure, since no counterfactual exists. In this way,
the most directly comparable sample analogue control group is used to assess the impacts of
program participation. Section 5 describes the results of applying matching methods to the sample
of treatment and control groups in addition to the standard descriptive statistics and regression
results.
5. Data
5.1 SMI loan size, term, interest rates, and usage
The average loan size was 425,000 rupees for SMI II, rising slightly to 456,000 rupees for SMI
III. The interest rate was 18 per cent for SMI II and slightly lower for SMI III.20 The loan term
remained unchanged at 10 years for both SMI II and SMI III. The majority of SMI loans were
used to purchase equipment or to accumulate ﬁxed assets. Across all ﬁrm sizes, roughly 60 per
cent of all SMI loans were used for equipment purchases, 15 per cent were used for buildings and
renovations, and 16 per cent were used for materials. These statistics are consistent with those of
ﬁrms from the control group that borrowed from other sources during the same period. In terms of
access requirements, the collateral type did not vary substantially across year or treatment/
control-group status. In all cases, roughly 85 per cent of all ﬁrms used equipment, buildings, or
land as the collateral for the loan, and, consequently, there does not appear to be any systematic
difference in collateral requirements across ﬁrms that received loans and/or credit from other
sources.21
20. The survey data reveal that the interest ratesof the SMI loan program are comparable with market
interest rates over this period, which implies a lack of subsidization at the retail level.
21. This would suggest that selection was basedon market characteristics and thattherefore selection
would be positive.14
5.2 Firm characteristics: treatment and control groups
The sample is split into two groups of ﬁrms: those that received SMI loans (the treatment group)
and those that did not (the control group). Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the treatment
and control group ﬁrms for 1985. The treatment group is smaller than the control group in terms
of sales, ﬁxed assets, equipment, and employment at the mean, and the ﬁrms are much younger
(columns 1 and 2). These differences are signiﬁcant, as highlighted by the t-statistics and
standardized differences. The treatment group, however, has a higher initial debt-to-equity ratio,
operating margin, value added to capital, and proﬁts to capital, although the differences in the last
two measures are not signiﬁcant. With respect to ﬁrm characteristics, SMI loan recipients tend to
be sole proprietorships located outside Colombo, and are also more likely to have Sinhalese
owners, but have similar education levels as the owners of ﬁrms in the control group (Table 1).
5.3 How did input use change?
A ﬁrst glance at the data would suggest that the SMI loan program was having the desired effect.
The impact of the SMI program appears to have inﬂuenced the mean growth rates of ﬁrms (Table
2). SMI recipients had faster growth rates in ﬁxed assets, equipment, and total employment
(although not signiﬁcantly different).22 Interestingly, employment growth was faster than asset
growth over this period, and therefore ﬁxed assets per worker fell for both groups. Equipment
growth per worker was positive for the treatment group and signiﬁcantly higher than for the
control group: this reﬂects the emphasis placed on equipment investment by the SMI program.
The impact of the SMI program on growth in value added, however, was negligible relative to the
control group. Interestingly, while average nominal wages rose over the period, due to high
inﬂation, real wages fell in a similar fashion for both types of ﬁrms.
The data reveal the large degree of “covariate imbalance” that exists in the control group. For key
ﬁrm-level measures, such as ﬁxed assets, sales, and employment, the standardized differences are
well outside acceptable ranges (Table 1).23 To correct this imbalance, “with replacement”
matching is implemented. First, probit results are generated to determine which characteristics are
correlated with receiving an SMI loan (Table 3). The results reveal that proﬁt rates do not ﬁgure
22. The results may be affected if the accounting rules employed bythe survey tend tounderestimate the
value of existing capital relative to new capital. Fortunately, the survey calculated the value of ﬁxed
assets that account for the asset’s replacement value, as opposed to simple accounting measures that




prominently in the determination of who received credit. Firm age and size, however, were
signiﬁcant but negative. This result contradicts the underlying notion that lenders use ﬁrm age and
size as a signal for quality. It could simply be the case that the survey did not match treatment and
control groups effectively across these dimensions. Past borrowing is correlated with credit access
in the sample. The positive sign on the linear term and the negative sign on the squared term
suggest that being moderately leveraged is a signal of credit-worthiness, while highly leveraged
ﬁrms are less likely to access credit.24 The remaining control variables, such as location, industry
classiﬁcation, and ownership structure, are not signiﬁcant. Previous credit history (as proxied by
the debt-to-equity ratio) is a signiﬁcant predictor of access. Interestingly, the squared term is
negative, which suggests that ﬁrms with high debt levels were not able to access the program. As
noted above, the efﬁcacy of the matching results depends heavily on the observable conditioning
variables. If credit access depended on unobservable characteristics, then the estimate of the
propensity score may be biased. For instance, credit access could depend on future investment
opportunities, managerial ability, or the degree of social connections between ﬁrm owners and
bank managers. If these characteristics are unaccounted for in the observables, then condition (8)
will not hold.25 While much of the heterogeneity can be captured by the rich set of conditioning
variables in the data, proxies for future investment opportunities remain elusive.26 Thus, while the
matching-method approach resolves many of the problems associated with program evaluation, it
is not a complete solution. Consequently, the matching-method results must be viewed as an
alternative means of verifying the results generated from standard non-experimental techniques.
Given values of the propensity scores, treatment ﬁrms are matched to the nearest neighbour with
replacement. Tables 1 and 2 show that propensity score matching dramatically reduces the degree
of covariate imbalance. In most cases, the standardized differences are under 10 per cent
(similarly, the per cent reduction in bias is also very large). Matching methods reveal differences
in SMI program impacts. Whereas use of the initial control group revealed that the treatment
group grew faster in terms of ﬁxed assets and other outcomes, this is not the case for the matched
sample. For instance, sales and employment actually grew more slowly for the treatment group.




25. The owner’s education, father’s and mother’s occupation, province of birth, and other characteristics
were included in the selection equation toaccount for some of these typically “unobservable”
characteristics, but the matching results were notsensitive to further inclusion of these conditioning
variables.
26. Theinabilitytocontrolforfutureinvestmentopportunitiesisarecurringproblemformoststudiesthat
use the accelerator framework. Tobin’sqis often used to account for this problem, but it too presents
empirical problems. Unfortunately, the SMIsurvey does not include publicly listed ﬁrms and thus
measures ofqare notavailable.16
Equipment and equipment per worker growth was still faster, however, even when matching is
conducted. Importantly, while treatment ﬁrms experienced slower employment growth, they had
higher average nominal-wage growth (but real wages fell over the period), although these
differences are not statistically signiﬁcant.27 Nevertheless, these results show that total wage and
employment growth occurred at the same time as equipment growth for the treatment ﬁrms.
6. Regression Results
6.1 Did the SMI program relax ﬁnancial constraints?
The accelerator model is estimated separately for the treatment and control groups, to test the
effectiveness of the SMI program in relaxing credit constraints. If the SMI program was
successful in relaxing credit constraints, then the accelerator model should produce different
estimates of the parameters for the respective groups. Table 4 shows the results for the switching
regression using an unmatched control group and treatment group for ﬁxed assets and equipment
investment, respectively. First, a probit regression is estimated to determine program
participation. The investment equation (1) is estimated by OLS with inclusion of the mills ratio
from the ﬁrst stage (Maddala 1988).28 This technique naturally raises questions regarding how
program participation is identiﬁed: if the characteristics that determine access to credit also
determine investment, then identiﬁcation of the selection correction will depend entirely on
functional form.29 Naturally, it would be ideal to ﬁnd ﬁrm characteristics that would predict
program access but not investment; however, it is not clear ex ante which variables satisfy this
requirement. Fortunately, the survey’s structure provides possible identifying variables, notably
the ﬁrm’s age, the owner’s ethnicity, and previous credit history characteristics, which are not
predictors of ﬁrm proﬁtability.30 In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrm characteristics, including owner ethnicity,
debt-to-equity, debt-to-equity squared, and age are used to identify participation in the program.31
Table 4 shows the results of the second-stage estimation by OLS. Controlling for ﬁrm-level
heterogeneity, the control-group ﬁrms’ investment rate responded to changes in value added and
past proﬁts more signiﬁcantly than treatment ﬁrms’ investment rates (compare columns 3 and 4,
or columns 7 and 8). This suggests that the SMI program relaxed the credit constraints of the
27. Inﬂation averaged over 10 per cent per year.
28. This methodology follows Nabi (1989), Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), and Cleary (1999).
29. In this case, the non-linearity of the probit regression isused toidentify selection.
30. The leverage criteria were not utilizedas part of the matching mechanism of the survey and thus one
canusethosecharacteristicstoidentifySMIprogramaccess.Ownerethnicityappearstobeapositive
determinant of access to credit; this would be consistentwith the fact that Sri Lanka’s Sinhalese
majority was being served by a Sinhalese-dominated banking system.
31. This section follows the methodology laid outby Greene (2000).17
treatment-group ﬁrms, because their investment decisions are less dependent on current or past
levels of ﬁrm performance. The regressions are repeated in Table 5 using only those ﬁrms with
positive cash ﬂow: the results remain essentially unchanged.32 Again, the SMI program appears to
have reduced the ﬁnancing constraints for the treatment group.
To check the results further, a matched control group is used in place of the unmatched survey
data (Table 6). For ﬁxed-asset and equipment growth, the matched sample control group reports
lower levels of sensitivity to changes in cash ﬂow, but similar sensitivity to lagged proﬁts, than the
original control group. Interestingly, the differences in sensitivity to cash ﬂow between the
treatment and control group for ﬁxed assets are negligible, but still signiﬁcantly different for
equipment investment. The exercise is repeated using ﬁrst differences (Table 7). The matched
control group exhibits much higher cash-ﬂow sensitivity than the treatment group.33
The SMI program reduced the credit constraints facing ﬁrms with respect to equipment
investment expenditures, according to standard regression techniques. Matching methods reduced
the differences between the control group and the treatment group; however, equipment
investment was still less sensitive to changes in cash ﬂow and lagged proﬁts for the treatment
group. Although this evidence would suggest, at ﬁrst blush, that the SMI program achieved its
goal of relaxing the credit constraints of the SMEs it served, it cannot be claimed that the program
was a “success.” A closer look at the impact of the program using alternative performance
measures, such as economic efﬁciency, is required.
6.2 Did the SMI program lead to higher proﬁtability?
The impact of the SMI program on proﬁtability is not apparent from the descriptive statistics: the
treatment group did not experience faster growth in value added, or proﬁts, over the sample
period. Likewise, there was no statistically signiﬁcant difference in the growth rates of value
added to capital, proﬁts to capital, or operating margins, even when matching methods were
employed (results not shown). To conﬁrm these results, the proﬁt function and input-demand
32. The exercise is repeated for the data between 1992 and 1995, and for ﬁrst differences, with
qualitatively similar results (which are not shown). The accelerator model is also estimated for the
pooled sample, butthe results are similar: the control group shows a higher sensitivity to cash ﬂow to




in determining the presence of ﬁnancial constraints. Evaluation of the SMI loan program provides a
natural experiment to test the “cash-ﬂow sensitivity” model, in thatthe splitting criterionbetween
“constrained”and “unconstrained” ﬁrms isprogram participation.18
function (3) and (4) are estimated jointly using seemingly unrelated regressions (Table 8).
Examining column 4 for the pooled sample, the results suggest that the ﬁrms that pay higher
wages are the ﬁrms that are more proﬁtable, despite the prediction of the model that proﬁts should
be decreasing in the wage rate.34 It is a well-known empirical fact, however, that more proﬁtable
ﬁrms pay higher wages, which suggests that there are ﬁrm-level unobservables that are correlated
to wages and proﬁtability.35 Similarly, the coefﬁcient on the interest rate should be negative, but
the results show a statistically insigniﬁcant relationship. After controlling for location and
industry dummies, the results indicate that SMI recipient ﬁrms were not relatively economically
efﬁcient when compared with non-SMI ﬁrms: the coefﬁcient for SMI recipient dummy does
not differ signiﬁcantly from zero (in fact, the sign is incorrect, because we would expect it to be
positive), and thus the hypothesis of equal economic efﬁciency cannot be rejected. Firms that
applied for and received the treatment did not have different levels of proﬁtability than ﬁrms that
did not, which suggests that the relaxation of credit constraints for a group of credit-constrained
ﬁrms did not lead directly to an increase in economic efﬁciency. Estimation of the labour-demand
function reveals that the hypothesis that the treatment and control groups are equally relatively
price efﬁcient ( ) can be rejected, although it is not rejected for the latest year in the
sample.36 SMI ﬁrms had lower labour-demand growth (as normalized by value added) than non-
SMI ﬁrms, which suggests that the treatment group was following a different behavioural rule
than the control group. This result is consistent with the notion that, although
SMI ﬁrms increased the labour input, they did less so than non-SMI ﬁrms. This may be due to the
fact that SMI ﬁrms invested more in equipment than non-SMI ﬁrms, which indicates that they
were substituting away from labour in favour of capital. Setting ﬁrms to be equally relatively price
efﬁcient , both types of ﬁrms fail the test of absolute price efﬁciency, since the
hypotheses  and  are strongly rejected. This last ﬁnding is not surprising,
however, given the positive coefﬁcient for the wage variable in the proﬁt function. Consequently,
no strong conclusions should be drawn regarding the absolute price efﬁciency of SMI vs. non-
SMI ﬁrms. Before we provide a deeper interpretation of the lack of impact of the SMI program on
ﬁrm proﬁtability, it is important to determine whether a failure to control for the potential
endogeneity of program participation is biasing the results.
34. This result directly contradicts the typical results found by Yotopoulos and Lau (1973).
35. One potential explanation for this result is an efﬁciency-wage story:ﬁrms that have higher proﬁts pay
workershigherwages,whothenworkharder,leadingtohigherproﬁtability.Analternativehypothesis
is that ﬁrms are not strictly competitive but earn rents, which are then shared with employees.
36. The survey data disaggregates labour by family and hired-in status,as well as by production,
administrative,andseasonalcategories.Consequently,thelabourinputiswellmeasuredanddoesnot
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6.3 First differences, selectivity correction, and matching methods
The proﬁt function is estimated using ﬁrst differences to remove ﬁrm-level ﬁxed effects, but the
results are similar (Table 9): SMI ﬁrms are not more proﬁtable than non-SMI ﬁrms.37 These
results, however, do not account for the problem of self-selection and should be treated with
caution.38 A treatment-effects model is estimated following Greene (2000) using a standard two-
step procedure. First, a probit regression is estimated to determine program participation, similar
to the results in equation (3).39 The participation hazard is included in the second-stage OLS
regression of the proﬁt function. Table 10 shows the treatment effect estimates. To account for the
notion that the beneﬁts from investment may take time to be realized, the proﬁt functions are
estimated for both 1992 and 1995. In either case, the coefﬁcient for program participation is
insigniﬁcant. Using this result and the value of the hazard, Table 10 reports the impact of the
program: . Interestingly, the treatment-effects model
reveals that the program did not have a positive impact on proﬁtability for the treatment ﬁrms. The
estimation of the proﬁt function is repeated using the matched data for the control group (Table
11). Again, the impact of the program on proﬁtability is not signiﬁcant.
6.4 Program impacts
The failure of the SMI program to positively affect the efﬁciency (as deﬁned by proﬁtability) of
the treatment group is clear: loan program recipients did not outperform the control group, when
self-selection is accounted for or matching methods used. The ﬁrst issue is whether the program
allocated credit efﬁciently. One of the underlying assumptions of the SMI program (and this
analysis) is that the efﬁcient allocation of credit is equivalent to the efﬁcient allocation of
resources. That is, by adhering to market forces, the program hoped to direct credit to those ﬁrms
that could best use the funds. It could be the case, however, that the criteria by which credit was
allocated did not achieve this result. Rather, PFIs allocated SMI loans to ﬁrms that were most able
to overcome the problems of asymmetric information (i.e., they had the highest likelihood of
repayment as viewed by the bank). This group of ﬁrms, while having characteristics that made
them safe credit risks, was not necessarily more efﬁcient than a set of comparable ﬁrms. The
results conﬁrm this intuition: ﬁrms that received credit from the program did experience a
relaxation of credit constraints and faster equipment (and equipment/worker) growth than ﬁrms in
the control group. This is compatible with the goals and design of the program, which are to
37. A ﬁxed-effects model was also estimated, with similarresults.
38. If selection is positive, then the coefﬁcient for the SMI dummy could be biased upwards.
39. Identiﬁcation of programparticipation follows the same logic as the switchingregression.
a E Pi SMIi ( 1) E Pi SMIi ( –0 ) == =20
enhance capital equipment expenditure by credit-constrained ﬁrms. However, this did not
translate into better performance. Despite considerably faster equipment/worker growth, ﬁrms in
the treatment group did not become more proﬁtable.40
This raises the question: why did the ﬁrms that received the program fail to become more
proﬁtable, despite their ability to access subsidized credit? Simple economic theory suggests that
access to subsidized credit should lead to higher proﬁts, primarily in two ways: ﬁrst, capital is
cheaper; and second, a substitution away from labour, which is made feasible by cheaper (and
more accessible) capital.41 The effect of the cheaper capital alone should lead to higher
proﬁtability, for a given level of capital. However, the ability to access cheaper capital may have
led to overinvestment: ﬁrms may have viewed the program as a “one-off” government program,
and thus deliberately overinvested in equipment for fear that they would miss the opportunity in
the future. In this sense, ﬁrms can be seen as investing for precautionary reasons, not to increase
proﬁtability immediately, but in the future. At the same time, the availability of cheaper capital
should have led to a substitution away from labour. But the empirical analysis suggests that the
increase in equipment investment by SMI recipients was not offset by a sufﬁciently large relative
decline in their labour input. Two factors contributed to this effect. First, despite higher capital
investment, SMI ﬁrms’ employment growth was similar to that of the control group for the 1985–
92 and 1992–95 periods (Table 12). Second, although ﬁrms in the treatment and control groups
exhibited similar negative real wage growth from 1985 to 1992, treatment ﬁrms experienced
larger increases in average real wages from 1992 onwards. This real wage increase occurred even
though treatment and control groups experienced similar growth in other outcomes during this
period (such as value added, ﬁxed asset, and employment growth; results not shown). The real
wage increase itself cannot be explained by changes in the composition of labour within ﬁrms:
family labour constituted only a small proportion of overall labour for both types of ﬁrms, and fell
over time (Table 12). Furthermore, although full recall data are not available, records from 1995
reveal that treatment and control groups had similar labour composition with respect to the mix of
administrative and production workers. Two possible explanations for the higher real wages paid
by the treatment group, especially after 1992, can be attributed to the introduction of new
40. An alternative explanation for the lack of positive impact on proﬁtability may stem from the survivor
biasof the sample.It couldbe thecase thatby accessingthe program, thetreatment ﬁrms were able to
survive longer than otherwise possible, since they were receiving an implicit subsidy (through access
to the SMI credit facility.) Ifthey had lacked such access, failure would be a more likely outcome.
Consequently, the treatment group isa negatively self-selected group that wouldshow lower levels of
proﬁtability than the control group (which also survived despite not accessing the program).
Fortunately, the matching-method technique overcomes this problem by ensuring that the control
group is an appropriate sample analogue.
41. Greater access to capital could also allow ﬁrms to produce more output (a supply effect).21
equipment technology as facilitated by the SMI loan program.42 First, as ﬁrms used their new
access to credit to purchase new equipment, they needed to add new, more highly skilled
labourers. One would expect that the treatment ﬁrms would have simultaneously reduced their
low-skill labour component: but labour market rigidities may have prevented ﬁrms from reducing
the use of their existing low-skill workforce (or, in the case of some of the ﬁrms in this sample,
family workers). Thus, while SMI ﬁrms were increasing their capital input substantially (relative
to the control group), they were also increasing their labour input, even though they did not
experience increases in sales relative to the control group. This suggests that, for the treatment
group, labour and capital are complements, as opposed to substitutes, in the production process.
While proﬁt-maximizing behaviour would be expected to lead to a reduction in labour demand for
the recipient ﬁrms, the opposite occurred: ﬁrms had to increase their labour input, given its
complementarity to capital.43 Second, workers may have been able to seize the rents of the credit
subsidy. The increased proﬁtability induced by access to subsidized capital was not kept by the
ﬁrm: rather, workers were able to capture a proportionately large share of this beneﬁt, due in part
to labour market rigidities in the Sri Lankan economy that beneﬁt workers. Consequently, the SMI
program did not enhance the economic efﬁciency of the treatment ﬁrms.
6.5 Indirect effects
The evaluation exercise conducted above estimated the returns to program participation for those
ﬁrms that were eligible for and took up the treatment. Underlying the evaluation technique was
theassumptionthattheprogramdidnotaffecttheoutcomesofthoseﬁrmsthatdidnotparticipate.
An economy-wide intervention, however, such as the SMI program, may have had an effect on
ﬁrms that were eligible to take up the program and did not (the control group). In a Walrasian
world, such effects need not be considered, since the impact of pecuniary externalities is
irrelevant, and any change in factor prices fully reveals the social cost of that input. But, in a
second-best world, any intervention that causes a distortion in factor markets could have negative
externalities. For instance, given that the SMI program was associated with higher average wages,
this could potentially spill over to other ﬁrms by affecting the wages paid to workers in similar
industries. In this case, the potential beneﬁts of the program, although inconclusive for the
treatment group, may actually undermine the economic efﬁciency for the untreated group, since
they are forced to pay higher wages. Similarly, the SMI program, while purporting to reduce
42. Thisresultisstriking,giventhatSMIﬁrmsare,onaverage,smallerthannon-SMIﬁrms,anditiswell-
known that larger ﬁrms pay higher wages.
43. This also suggests that, when ﬁnancial capital is fungible within the ﬁrm, access to credit implies that
ﬁrms that use capital as “working capital” toﬁnance the purchase of variable inputs.22
credit constraints, may have led to a reduction in credit to ﬁrms that were not eligible to access the
program. That is, ﬁrms that could access formal credit previously, but were unable to access the
SMI program because of non-market program eligibility requirements, might have faced credit
rationing as PFIs directed their own capital to SMI lending (since PFIs had incentives to direct
their own capital to the program, given the lower capital requirement).44 Such indirect effects
place an upward bias on the estimated treatment effect. Because of the negative or insigniﬁcant
effect of the treatment, however, the results are robust to this bias. In fact, it is possible the
evaluation method has underestimated the SMI loan program’s negative consequences.
7. Conclusions
This paper has examined the investment behaviour of a sample of small, credit-constrained ﬁrms
in Sri Lanka. Using a unique panel-data set, we analyzed and compared the activities of two
groups of small ﬁrms distinguished by their different access to ﬁnancing; one group consisted of
ﬁrms with heavily subsidized loans from the World Bank, and the other consisted of ﬁrms without
such subsidies. We have found that the World Bank loan program did lead to higher levels of
investment for ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms, but the impact of the loan program on economic
efﬁciency is inconclusive. The use of program-evaluation techniques revealed that the relaxation
of ﬁnancing constraints did not affect economic efﬁciency for the group of ﬁrms that received
subsidized capital. Although the program allowed ﬁrms to invest in more capital goods, ﬁrms
were not able to reduce their labour component enough to achieve allocative efﬁciency. That is,
SMI recipient ﬁrms did substitute from capital to labour, as they hired more workers and generally
paid them higher wages. There are two potential explanations for this phenomena: (i) that labour
and capital are complements in the production function, and (ii) that workers were able to capture
rents from ﬁrms that accessed the SMI loans. Any improvements in proﬁtability inevitably went
to workers. Lastly, we cannot discount the possibility that the SMI program was seen as a “one-
off” program, and that ﬁrms simply took advantage of the program while it existed. The lack of
positive impacts suggests that the implementation of credit schemes, while relaxing ﬁnancial
constraints, may not necessarily lead to higher levels of economic efﬁciency.
44. On the contrary, it could also be the case that the SMI programreduced credit constraints for the
economyasawhole,andthusthecontrolgroupbeneﬁtedfromlowerﬁnancingconstraints.However,
we believe this effect to be small. Similarly, one should also consider the positive impact of higher
wages on the economy through an aggregate demand effect.Given that the SMI program was quite
smallrelativetotheentireeconomy,however,thisincomeeffectisverylimited,andthereisnoreason
to believe that the control group wouldenjoy beneﬁts inexcess of the treatment group.23
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Note: The standardized difference in per cent is the absolute value of the mean difference as a percentage
of the average standard deviation: ,where, for each variable, and are
the sample means in the treated group and the control group, and and are the corresponding sample
variances.






















Fixed assets 7582 17849 33.80 2.53 6378 12.21 1.03
Equipment 3131 6875 29.40 2.53 3205 1.10 0.09
Employment 30 47 38.50 3.33 40.3 16.21 1.38
Sales 12272 32866 46.67 2.60 8800 25.93 2.19
Value added 4984 11117 32.20 2.50 5205 2.31 0.19
Debt/equity 0.62 0.48 7.85 0.70 0.71 5.24 0.40
Age 6.05 12.41 41.00 3.55 6.35 0.22 2.58
Wages 1519 3259 38.19 3.30 2218 21.46 1.82
Avg Wage 183 212 25.12 2.09 172 9.99 0.83
Value added
capital
1.78 1.61 2.83 0.24 1.65 1.98 0.17
Proﬁts/capital 0.56 0.38 9.50 0.78 0.43 6.16 0.53
Proﬁts/sales 0.10 0.07 26.07 2.09 0.08 24.95 2.01
Location
 Colombo 0.47 0.59 24.24 2.04 0.46 2.00 0.14
 Gampaha 0.25 0.20 12.45 1.07 0.16 22.31 1.79
 Kurungala 0.13 0.09 12.50 1.08 0.20 19.23 1.80
Ownership type
 Sole prop. 0.62 0.38 48.97 4.36 0.63 2.04 0.12
 Partnership 0.16 0.22 15.16 1.37 0.14 5.62 0.62
 Priv. lim. liab. 0.20 0.35 33.95 2.82 0.21 2.50 0.09
Ethnicity
 Sinhalese 0.74 0.44 61.58 5.55 0.77 9.29 0.68
100 x1 x2 – () /[(s1
2 s2
2)/2]




Note: The standardized difference in per cent is the absolute value of the mean difference as a percentage
of the average standard deviation: , where, for each variable and are
the sample means in the treated group and the control group, and and are the corresponding sample
variances.














Fixed assets 5.64 4.07 0.78 5.63 0.17
Equipment 10.31 4.53 1.61 4.23 1.90
Employment 6.52 5.45 1.04 8.85 1.15
Fixed asset/worker –0.50 –1.01 0.30 –1.13 0.03
Equipment/worker 3.83 –1.00 1.69 –4.20 2.53
Sales 4.68 6.38 0.71 8.55 1.93
Value added 5.87 4.50 0.61 8.56 1.11
Total wages 4.48 3.46 0.64 6.65 0.70
Total wages/
employment
0.62 0.56 0.14 0.42 0.60
Average real wage –1.81 –1.89 0.04 –2.20 0.12








Notes: *, ** indicate signiﬁcance at the 5 per cent and 10 per cent levels, respectively. Robust standard
errors are reported.
Table 3: Probit Results
Dependant variable: Firm received an SMI loan
Variables (1) (2) (3)















































LR Chi2 (14) 45.77 53.37 71.61
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.14 0.19
N 278 278 2782
9
Notes: *, ** indicate signiﬁcance at the 5 per cent and 10 per cent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported. N = 278.
Table 4: Accelerator Model (unmatched data)


















































Ln (size) (t–1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls
 Mills ration No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
 Location Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 Ownership Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 Ethnicity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

















F 4.61 2.85 4.47 2.77 4.33 2.24 4.05 2.34
R2 0.4477 0.2003 0.4628 0.2077 0.4548 0.1414 0.4554 0.1423
D3
0
Notes: *, ** indicate signiﬁcance at the 5 per cent and 10 per cent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported. N = 278.
Table 5: Accelerator Model for Firms with Positive Cash Flow (unmatched data)


















































Ln size (t–1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls
Mills ratio No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Location Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ownership Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

















F 4.04 2.15 3.77 2.20 5.00 1.88 5.17 2.09
R2 0.4409 0.1535 0.4413 0.1618 0.4587 0.1534 0.4658 0.1617
D31
Notes: *, ** indicate signiﬁcance at the 5 per cent and 10 per cent levels, respectively. Bootstrapped
standard errors are reported.
Table 6: Accelerator Model (matched data)
Dependent variable:              Investment/                               Equipment investment/










































Mills ratio No No No No
Location Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ownership Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity Yes Yes Yes Yes









F 32.85 2.85 14.26 2.24
R2 0.6581 0.2003 0.5645 0.1414
D32
Notes: *, ** indicate signiﬁcance at the 5 per cent and 10 per cent levels, respectively. Bootstrapped
standard errors are reported.
Table 7: Accelerator Model for First Differences (matched data)
Dependent variable         Investment/                               Equipment investment/











































F 16.81 4.65 28.75 6.80
R2 0.2479 0.1268 0.3703 0.1313
D33
Note: * indicates signiﬁcance at the 5 per cent level. Robust standard errors are reported. N = 278.
Table 8: Estimation of Proﬁt Function (using seemingly unrelated regressions)









































Location dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes









N 278 278 278 834
















not rejected not rejected not rejected rejected
rejected rejected not rejected rejected
rejected rejected rejected rejected











Notes: *, ** indicate signiﬁcance at the 5 per cent and 10 per cent levels, respectively. Robust standard
errors are reported. N = 278.
Table 9: Proﬁt Function Estimation for First Differences















































F 33.59 26.67 22.09 162.04**
R2 0.2220 0.2306 0.231235
Notes: * indicates signiﬁcance at the 5 per cent level. The treatment effect, , is calculated as in Greene
(2000). N = 278. Speciﬁcations (1) and (2) utilize the estimates from the probit regression in Table 3,
column (2), while speciﬁcations (3) and (4) utilize the estimates from the probit regression in Table 3,
column (3).
Table 10: Proﬁt Function Estimation for Treatment Effects





























































0.0177 –0.0737 –0.2189 –0.3037
0.9412 0.9610 0.9513 0.9808
Chi2 (13) 425.36 434.89 440.64 444.25









Notes: * indicates signiﬁcance at the 5 per cent level. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported.   ‡
indicates Wald chi2(5) statistic.
Table 11: Proﬁt Function Estimation for Matching Data























































Yes Yes Yes No No











F 38.81 36.62 34.34 10.68 278.16‡





Table 12: Labour Market Characteristics
Real wage growth 1985–92 1992–95
SMI –1.81 2.25
Non-SMI –2.20 –0.34













SMI 8.3 67.0 24.7
Non-SMI 10.1 66.6 23.2
Family workers (% of total
employees)
1985 1992 1995
SMI 3.7 2.6 2.4




SMI 1.14 1.33 1.45
Non-SMI 0.83 1.03 0.8338
Appendix A: Accelerator Model1
The investment decisions of a ﬁrm in a world of certainty can be analyzed under the framework of
the accelerator model. First, assume that it is costly to invest: for investment I, the cost of
investment is convex, such that , for all . Next, assume standard
production function relationships such that proﬁts are a strictly concave function of the capital
stock ,where . The optimal path of investment can be described by
the following Euler equation:
. (A1)
Under the assumption of constant prices, (A1) implies the following ﬂexible accelerator model:
, (A2)
where K* satisﬁes . The implications are straightforward. If credit rationing
occurs (that is, if ﬁrms are constrained), then the user cost of capital increases, implying a higher
marginal product of capital and slower movement in adjusting capital stocks over time.
The accelerator model describes the path of investment when there are costs associated with
different speeds of capital stock adjustment. Firms will behave according to (A2) if there are
perfect capital markets or if they have sufﬁcient internally generated funds. Otherwise, the
investment process will also be determined by the availability of internal funds, or credit market
constraints. The existence of capital stock adjustment costs and credit market constraints can be
built into an empirical speciﬁcation of the accelerator model, as follows. Given that the ﬁrm forms
expectations of future output Q*, where  = K*, (A2) can be expressed to incorporate the
potential effects of capital stock adjustment costs to investment and credit market constraints:2
. (A3)
Furthermore, if there are ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics that may differentially affect access to credit
markets differently, (A3) can be augmented to account for this ﬁrm-level heterogeneity:
, (A4)
1. ThisappendixfollowsTybout(1983)intermsofnotation.Theacceleratormodelcanbethoughtofas
a special case of the Euler equation approach if the cost function depends solely on investment
(Bigsten et al. 1999.)
2. This speciﬁcation assumes the separability of ﬁnancial variablesfrom real variables in the investment
process, but this strong assumption isclearly utilized as an empirical necessity.
F' I () 0 > F'' I () 0 > I 0 >
PP Kt , () = Pk 0 Pkk 0 < , >
Pk Kt , ()rF' I () F'' I () I˙ – =
It b K*-Kt [] =
PK K* ()rF'0 () =
aQ*
It ba Qt
* Kt 1 – – [] h P t 1 – + =
It ba Qt
* Kt 1 – – [] h P t 1 – d Xt et ++ + =39
where the Xs can include ﬁrm location, industry classiﬁcation, owner education and socio-
economic status, and other ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics. This leads to the following functional
form, suggested by Bigsten et al. (1999):
, (A5)
where I is investment, K is capital, is change in value added, is proﬁts, and the Xs are ﬁrm-
level characteristics.
IK t 1 – ¤a 0 a1DVK t 1 – ¤a 2 P K ¤ () t 1 – a3Xt et ++ + + =
DV P40
Appendix B: Proﬁt Function (Yotopoulos and Lau 1973)1
Let H*(c, Z) be the proﬁt function corresponding to the production function F(X,Z), where c is the
price of the jth input, X is a vector of variable inputs, and Z is the vector of ﬁxed inputs. The
production function and corresponding proﬁt function is V = AF(X,Z) and .
If the shadow cost of variable inputs varies across ﬁrms by the index function, , then the proﬁt
function for the ith ﬁrm is:
. (B1)
Using Shepard’s Lemma, one can derive the input demand functions and supply functions from
(B1):
, (B2)
and thus proﬁts can be represented as
. (B3)
The implication of (B3) is that one can test relative economic efﬁciency between two ﬁrms. This
framework, in turn, has several implications. First, , and thus actual proﬁts are
increasing in technical efﬁciency for a set of given input shadow prices. Second, if for
, .....,m, then the ﬁrm is maximizing proﬁts. Third, if and , then the actual
proﬁt functions are identical. Consequently, one can test the relative economic efﬁciency of two
ﬁrms given a functional form for H.
The above model can be used to test relative economic efﬁciency for a given functional form. In
this case, a Cobb-Douglas production function with the usual properties can be used. There are m
variable inputs characterized by decreasing returns, and n ﬁxed inputs for the production function:
, (B4)
1. This appendix presents the proﬁt function model as developed byYotopoulos and Lau (1973). This
exposition follows their model in terms of notation and model speciﬁcation.
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where . The proﬁt function is
. (B5)






Thus, the proﬁt function becomes
. (B9)
If there are two ﬁrms, i = 1,2 and thus  and , take the ratio of the constant terms described
above:
. (B10)
Then, one can take (B10) to get:
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taking natural logs of (B11) to get
. (B13)
If A1 = A2 and k1 = k2, then should be equal to and this implies that . Within
this framework, it is possible to test the hypothesis of equal relative economic efﬁciency by
inserting a dummy variable into (B13) and determining whether the coefﬁcient is zero. In
previous studies, the emphasis has focused on assessing the relative economic efﬁciency of large
and small ﬁrms. In the context of this paper, the test is straightforward. A dummy variable can be
inserted to capture the relative economic efﬁciency of SMI recipients.
The empirical implementation is straightforward. For a Cobb-Douglas production function with
labour as the variable input and capital ﬁxed, the proﬁt function (B13) can be expressed as:
,
where is the actual proﬁt (total revenue minus total variable costs), w is the wage rate, R is the
interest rate on capital, and K is the ﬁxed assets of the ﬁrm. Allowing for regional and industry-
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where SMI is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the ﬁrm received an SMI loan, and 0
otherwise; ISIC is the industry code and LOC captures the ﬁrm’s location. These last two vectors
of dummy variables control for different output prices for ﬁrms in different industries or regions.






The input demand function differs across ﬁrms by a constant factor. This result can be used to test
the hypothesis of relative price efﬁciency: if k1 = k2, then . Likewise, one can test the
hypothesis of proﬁt maximization. If the ith ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts, then .
From this condition, it follows that . The empirical implementation of (B16) is
straightforward:
, (B17)
where w is the wage rate, L is the quantity of labour, and SMI indicates the status of the SMI loan
recipient.
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Appendix C: Switching Regression1
A ﬁrst approximation of the impact of ﬁnancing constraints on ﬁrm behaviour can be obtained by
estimating equation (1) using switching regression techniques (Maddala 1988). That is, one can




where Ii is investment, Xi are the determinants of investment described above, and Z is a matrix of




and where u1i, u2i, and ui are distributed trivariate normal with mean zero and covariance matrix,
,
the following likelihood function is obtained:
(C3)
.
Lee (1978) provides a simple two-stage process to estimate (C3). First, the expected value of u1i
and u2i must be estimated from (C1a) and (C1b). That is, obtain . Lee shows that:
1. This appendix follows Maddala (1988) in terms of notation.
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where and are the pdf and cdf of the standard normal. Thus equations (C1a) and (C1b)






and  and  are the residuals with zero means:
.
The estimation of the second stage by OLS for equations (C6a) and (C6b) is straightforward.
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Appendix D: Treatment Effects
The treatment-effects model (Greene 2000) estimates the following equation:
, (D1)
where are proﬁts, X is a vector of ﬁrm characteristics, SMI is a dummy variable indicating
whether the ﬁrm participated in the SMI program, and there is an error term with the usual
properties. The binary dummy variable is characterized by a latent process:
, (D2)
and thus the decision to take the treatment is made according to the following rule:
, (D3)
and the error terms u and are bivariate normal with the following covariance matrix:
.
The two-estimator is derived by Maddala (1988). First, a probit is estimated for participation in
the treatment:
. (D4)
From (D4) the hazard ratio for each I can be calculated:
, (D5)
(D5)
where  and  are the standard normal density and cumulative distribution functions. Thus,
. (D6)
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If  = 0, then (D4) can be estimated by OLS and the treatment effect is . If selection were
positive, then  > 0 and the OLS estimate of  would be biased upwards.
E P ( i | Zi 1) E P ( i | Zi –0 )d r s
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F Zig () 1 F Zig () – {}
---------------------------------------------------- + == =
rd
rdBank of Canada Working Papers
Documents de travail de la Banque du Canada
Working papers are generally published in the language of the author, with an abstract in both ofﬁcial
languages. Les documents de travail sont publiés généralement dans la langue utilisée par les auteurs; ils sont
cependant précédés d’un résumé bilingue.
Copies and a complete list of working papers are available from:
Pour obtenir des exemplaires et une liste complète des documents de travail, prière de s’adresser à :
Publications Distribution, Bank of Canada Diffusion des publications, Banque du Canada
234 Wellington Street, Ottawa, Ontario  K1A 0G9 234, rue Wellington, Ottawa (Ontario) K1A 0G9
E-mail: publications@bankofcanada.ca  Adresse électronique : publications@banqueducanada.ca
Web site: http://www.bankofcanada.ca Site Web : http://www.banqueducanada.ca
2003
2003-36 Excess Collateral in the LVTS: How Much
is Too Much? K. McPhail and A. Vakos
2003-35 Real Exchange Rate Persistence in Dynamic
General-Equilibrium Sticky-Price Models: An
Analytical Characterization H. Bouakez
2003-34 Governance and Financial Fragility: Evidence from a
Cross-Section of Countries M. Francis
2003-33 Do Peer Group Members Outperform Individual
Borrowers? A Test of Peer Group Lending Using
Canadian Micro-Credit Data R. Gomez and E. Santor
2003-32 The Canadian Phillips Curve and Regime Shifting F. Demers
2003-31 A Simple Test of Simple Rules: Can They Improve How
Monetary Policy is Implemented with Inﬂation Targets? N. Rowe and D. Tulk
2003-30 Are Wealth Effects Important for Canada? L. Pichette and D. Tremblay
2003-29 Nominal Rigidities and Exchange Rate Pass-Through
in a Structural Model of a Small Open Economy S. Ambler, A. Dib, and N. Rebei
2003-28 An Empirical Analysis of Liquidity and Order
Flow in the Brokered Interdealer Market for
Government of Canada Bonds C. D’Souza, C. Gaa, and J. Yang
2003-27 Monetary Policy in Estimated Models of Small
Open and Closed Economies A. Dib
2003-26 Measuring Interest Rate Expectations in Canada G. Johnson
2003-25 Income Trusts—Understanding the Issues M.R. King
2003-24 Forecasting and Analyzing World Commodity Prices R. Lalonde, Z. Zhu, and F. Demers
2003-23 What Does the Risk-Appetite Index Measure? M. Misina
2003-22 The Construction of Continuity-Adjusted
Monetary Aggregate Components J. Kottaras
2003-21 Dynamic Factor Analysis for Measuring Money P.D. Gilbert and L. Pichette